

CONCEPT OF OPNS

I. BRIEFING PLAN

II. LESSONS LEARNED

● LETHALITY

● CMB ARMS TM

● TRAINING

III. CONCEPT OF OPNS

IV. STATUS OF LESSONS

LEARNED

V. OPNS SYSTEMS IMPACT

MOVE



SUPPRESS

DESTROY

SEE

CONTROL

SUPPORT



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" THE ARAB - ISRAELI WAR DRAMATIZED THE LETHALITY OF MODERN ANTI - TANK WEAPONS , INCLUDING MOST PARTICULARLY THE HIGH VELOCITY TANK CANNON AND THE LONG RANGE ANTI - TANK GUIDED MISSILE . WITH ONE EXCEPTION (THE BATTLE OF KURSK IN 1943) , THERE HAS NEVER BEEN A COMPARABLE LOSS OF TANKS IN SUCH A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME "

" IF THE RATE OF LOSS WHICH OCCURRED IN THE ARAB - ISRAELI WAR DURING THE SHORT PERIOD OF 18 TO 20 DAYS WERE EXTRAPOLATED TO THE BATTLEFIELDS OF EUROPE OVER A PERIOD OF 60 TO 90 DAYS , THE RESULTING LOSSES WOULD REACH LEVELS FOR WHICH THE UNITED STATES ARMY IS NOT PREPARED IN ANY WAY . "

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CHART 2

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PROLIFERATION

(ALL FIGURES APPROXIMATE)

TANKS
APC'S
ARTY TUBES
AD BTRY
DEPLOYED

	TANKS	APC'S	ARTY TUBES	AD BTRY DEPLOYED
ARAB	4000	3000	3000	150
ISRAELI	2000	4500*	800	10-15

*INCLUDES HALF TRACKS

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INTENSE 18-DAY BATTLE

(ALL FIGURES APPROXIMATE)

● LOSSES TANKS APC'S ARTY TUBES


ARAB	1500-2000	1000	500
ISRAELI	700-1000	1500-2000*	50-75

*INCLUDES HALF TRACKS


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TODAY'S TANKS ARE ABOUT TEN TIMES
MORE EFFECTIVE THAN WORLD WAR II TANKS



SHERMAN M-4




M60A1

CHART 5

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ADVANCE IN TANK CANNON TECHNOLOGY



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


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CHART 6

50-50 HIT PROBABILITY


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WW II KOREA NOW

UNCLASSIFIED CHART 7


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THE APFSDS ROUND OF THE T-62 TANK CAN
TRAVEL 1 MILE IN ONE SECOND - IT IS THE
FASTEST TANK CANNON ROUND IN THE WORLD:




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CHART 9

PROBABILITY OF FIRST ROUND KILL

STATIONARY T-62 (APFSDS)
SHOOTING AT M60A1




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PROBABILITY OF FIRST ROUND KILL

SAGGER SHOOTING

AT M60A1



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CAN BE HIT

--- WHAT CAN BE HIT,

CAN BE KILLED




CHART 12

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"....TANKS AND OTHER COMBAT ELEMENTS WHICH EXPOSE THEM -
SELVES DURING OFFENSIVE ACTION WILL SUFFER UNACCEPTABLE
LOSSES UNLESS THEIR VULNERABILITY CAN BE DECREASED THROUGH
IMPROVED TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES OF MOVEMENT WHICH BETTER
USE THE TERRAIN , AND THE APPLICATION OF SUPPRESSIVE FIRE
OF ENEMY ANTI - TANK WEAPONS . I BELIEVE THAT IS THE SINGLE
MOST IMPORTANT LESSON ON THE ARAB - ISRAELI WAR ."

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CHART 13

FOREIGN VIEWS ON THE TANK

BRITISH


"THE TANK TODAY IS STILL DOMINANT, BUT IT MUST BE SUPPORTED BY OTHER ARMS".

"THE SAGGER DID NOT MAKE THE TANK OBSOLETE. SHARON AND OTHER ARMOR DIVISION COMMANDERS WHO FOLLOWED IN HIS FOOTSTEPS PLASTERED THE EGYPTIANS USING, ESSENTIALLY, TANKS IN THE LIDDEL HART MANNER".


SOVIET

" IN TODAY'S CONDITIONS OF RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONRY THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TANK FORCES NOT ONLY HAS NOT DIMINISHED, BUT IS INCREASING. AS BEFORE, SOVIET MILITARY SCIENCE ACCORDS THEM THE ROLE OF THE MAIN STRIKING AND MANEUVERING FORCE OF THE LAND FORCES. TANK UNITS ... CAN EFFECTIVELY TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE RESULTS OF NUCLEAR ROCKET STRIKES AND ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE OPERATION".

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TANKS
CAN'T DO IT ALONE



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
AIR DEFENSE

FIELD ARTILLERY

MECH INFANTRY

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

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


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CHART 16


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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS PERFORMANCE ENVELOPES



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SINGLE BURST PROBABILITY OF A-KILL (NO MANEUVER, 500M OFFSET, 500M ALT, 400 KTS)



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" OUR AIR FORCE WILL BE ABLE TO OPERATE ON A SUSTAINED BASIS OVER THE BATTLE AREA IN OUR SUPPORT ONLY WHEN AIR DEFENSES HAVE BEEN DESTROYED OR SUPPRESSED . CASUAL OR MARGINAL USE OF FIGHTERS WILL NO LONGER BE POSSIBLE . RATHER , WE WILL NEED TO PLAN AND EXECUTE OPERATIONS WITH THE AIR FORCE AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE COMBINED ARMS TEAM "

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CHART 19

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ISRAELI AIR LOSSES

GROUND SYSTEMS

SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES 41%

GROUND GUN SYSTEMS 26%

UNDETERMINED

6%
73%

AIR TO AIR COMBAT

3%

OTHER (TECHNICAL, UNKNOWN) 24%

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CHART 2C

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MAVERICK

- 35 TANKS

- 15 BUNKERS

50

42 DIRECT HITS